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Abstract: Community development in the pesantren was initiated by 
Muslim activists who joined LP3ES and P3M in response to 
the excess of top-down Modernization (Developmentalism) of 
the New Order. Through these NGOs the activists 
strengthened the pesantren to become agents of community 
development at the grass root level.It is argued that despite 
the fact that LP3ES and P3M provided the pesantren with 
participatory methods absent from the top-down New Order 
development model, they share the Modernization paradigm 
with the New Order.  This paradigm focuses more on service 
delivery and fails to offer an alternative for achieving macro 
social and political transformation. 
Keywords: Pesantren, Ccommunity Development, the New Order, 
Modernization. 
Abstrak: Pengembangan masyarakat di pesantren diprakarsai oleh 
para aktivis Muslim yang bergabung dengan LP3ES dan 
P3M sebagai tanggapan terhadap kelebihan modernisasi 
top-down (Developmentalism) Orde Baru. Melalui LSM-LSM 
ini para aktivis memperkuat pesantren untuk menjadi agen 
pengembangan masyarakat di tingkat akar rumput. 
Dikatakan bahwa terlepas dari kenyataan bahwa LP3ES dan 
P3M memberi pesantren metode partisipatif yang tidak ada 
dalam model pembangunan Orde Baru yang top-down, 
mereka berbagi paradigma modernisasi dengan Orde Baru. 
Paradigma ini lebih berfokus pada pemberian layanan dan 
gagal menawarkan alternatif untuk mencapai transformasi 
sosial dan politik makro. 
Kata Kunci: Pesantren, Pengembangan Masyarakat, Orde Baru, 
Modernisasi. 
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A. Introduction 
Since the late 1970s community development has been 
promoted by non-government organisations in Indonesia such as 
LP3ES (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi 
dan Sosial). Such organisations have sought to redress the failure of 
top-down Modernization of the New Order government as a strategy 
to bring about equality in economic prosperity. Despite the fact that 
Indonesia’s economy grew at 8.0 percent annually in the period of 
1965-1980,1 and at 5.1 percent during 1980-1988,2 the New Order 
Modernization denied equality in sharing the process and product of 
development and denied politically meaningful participation in 
development.3 LP3ES used the pesantren as an entry point to promote 
a participatory approach to social and economic development.  The 
pesantren’s capacity to stimulate social mobilisation in pursuit of 
other purposes was seen as an important asset to the implementation 
of community development. 
This article will discuss the paradigm of community 
development in the pesantren. This article argues that despite the fact 
that LP3ES and P3M provided the pesantren with participatory 
methods absent from the top-down New Order development model, 
they share the Modernization paradigm with the New Order.  This 
paradigm focuses more on service delivery and fails to offer an 
alternative for achieving macro social and political transformation. 
The first section explains the New Order Modernization and 
examines the emergence of LP3ES and P3M, exploring their role in 
the origin of community development in the pesantren. The second 
section deals with the paradigm developed by LP3ES and P3M in the 
implementation of community development in the pesantren. 
 
 
 
 
1World Bank, World Development Report 1991: Proverty (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 180. 
2Arief Budiman, “The emergence of the Bureaucratic Capitalist State in 
Indonesia,” dalam Reflections on Development in Southeast Asia (Sinagpore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), 127. 
3Purwo Santoso, “Political Chalanges to Sustainable Development in 
Indonesia” (MA Thesis, UMI Dissertation Service, 1992), 121–37. 
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B. The New Order Modernization 
When the military New Order regime under Soeharto came to 
power in 1967, replacing the Old Order regime of President 
Soekarno, the regime focused on Modernization to remedy many ills 
besetting the nation.  These were perceived to be political instability, 
economic collapse, and misuse of state doctrines; the Pancasila and 
constitution of 1945.4 The new regime then introduced the ideas of 
pragmatism, de-ideologisation, depoliticisation and development 
(pembangunan). Economic development was needed to direct 
people’s attention away from politics and towards the economy and to 
change the national slogan from ‘politics as commander’ as practised 
by the old regime to ‘economy as commander’.5 Under the jargon of 
pembangunan, developmentalism became a new official orthodoxy 
signified by the establishment of Kabinet Pembangunan I 
(Development Cabinet I, June 1968-March 1973). 
 The dominant concept of developmentalism applied by the 
New Order reflects western paradigms of development, that is, a kind 
of stage-by-stage movement towards ‘higher modernity’ in the forms 
of technology and economic advance (idea of progress).6 
Modernization advocates the process by which so-called traditional 
structures and societies are transformed into more modern types, 
along a developmental trajectory mirroring the earlier reforms of the 
European Industrial Revolution. Modernization encompasses 
secularisation, commercialisation, industrialisation, increasing 
material standard of living, diffusion of literacy, education, mass 
media, national unification, and the expansion of popular involvement 
in participation. 
 With the assistance of ‘Berkeley Mafia’, the New Order 
regime adopted the modernization theory introduced by WW Rostow 
in his book The Stage of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist 
 
4Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and The 
Ideology of Tolerance (London: Routledge, 1995), 23-25. 
5Fachri Ali dan Bahtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: 
Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), 
94-95. 
6Bjorn Hettne, Development Theory and The Three Worlds: Towards an 
International Political Economy of Development (New York: Longman Scientific 
and Technical, 1995), 49-57. 
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Manifesto.7 This theory uses the metaphor of growth in an organism 
to explain modernization. In this case, development is seen from an 
evolutionary perspective as a journey from ‘traditional to modern’. 
The assumption here is that all societies were once alike (traditional), 
and that the Third World will also pass through the same set of 
changes as experienced in the West to eventually become ’modern’. 
Rostow argues that development will flow almost automatically from 
capital accumulation. As savings are invested in productive activities, 
capital accumulates. This process leads to economic growth. The 
most intense activity, and hence the greatest contribution to economic 
growth, is generated by the industrial sector. This is obvious from the 
series of Indonesian five-year development plans (Repelita) in which 
industrialisation became the driving force.8 
Modernization of the New Order was also based on the 
theories introduced by David McClelland and Inkeles and Smith. 
McClelland based his theory on Weber, arguing that if the Protestant 
Ethic caused economic growth in the West, then some analogous 
phenomenon must be sought in other places in order to achieve 
economic growth. What lay behind Weber’s theory, McClelland 
argues, is a personality trait, ‘the need for achievement’ (N-Ach). The 
reason why people in the Third World countries, including Indonesia, 
are underdeveloped is because they have a low sense of this need for 
achievement (traditional mentality and belief in predetermination).9 
Indonesia’s economy grew at 8.0 percent annually in the 
period of 1965-1980,10 and despite the global recession occurring in 
1980-1988, it achieved 5.1 percent growth.11 Apart from the industrial 
sector, which grew by 11.9 percent between 1965 and 1980 and by 
5.1 percent in the 1980-1988 period, the upward surge of oil prices in 
the 1970s contributed to Indonesian economic development. In 1972, 
 
7See WW Rostow, The Stage of Economic: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). 
8See Anne Booth, Agricultural Development in Indonesia (Sydney: Allen 
and Unwin, 1988). 
9Mansour Faqih, “The Role of Non-Govermental Organizations in Social 
Transformation: A Participaory Inquiry in Indonesia” (UMI Dissertation Service, 
1995), 65. 
10World Bank, World Development Report 1991: Proverty, 180. 
11Budiman, “The emergence of the Bureaucratic Capitalist State in 
Indonesia,” 127. 
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Indonesian crude sold for less than $US 3 a barrel, but by 1980 the 
price increased to over $US30. In the period 1970-81, export 
revenues from oil increased at a rate of 45.5 per cent. Oil and gas 
accounted for 37 per cent of total export revenue in 1970, and by 
1981 this proportion had climbed to 82 per cent.12 
Economic growth has improved people’s well-being. People’s 
life expectancy at birth rose from 41.2 years in 1960 to 61.5 years, the 
under five mortality rate dropped from 225 per 1,000 live births in 
1960 to 100 in 1989, access to safe water increased from 11 percent 
of the population during 1975-1980 to 46 percent in 1988 and adult 
literacy increased from 54 percent in 1970 to 72 percent in 1985. This 
can be attributed to improvement in the combined primary and 
secondary enrolment ratio, which rose from 49 percent in 1970 to 84 
percent in 1987. The real GDP per capita also increased from US$490 
in 1960 to US$ 1,820 in 1988.13 
This development, however, denied equality by failing to 
share the process and the product of development, and by excluding 
politically meaningful participation in development.14 Inequality in 
development is an unavoidable situation, although there were some 
attempts to redistribute the fruit of development. There is no sign that 
inequality will end quickly, as Indonesia has implemented a structural 
adjustment program. This was done in response to the decline of oil 
and gas revenue in the early 1980s. As external debt increased 
liberalization of the economy, private big business groups were 
encouraged to gain more control of productive assets. In this context, 
Robison (1986) notes that economic development in the New Order 
has given rise to a number of very large and diversified domestic 
business groups. They are the only economic agents benefiting from 
the liberalisation measures which lead to conglomeration.15 Spatial 
 
12Michael J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, 
Development, and Pressure for Change (London: Routledge, 1994), 34-35. 
13United Nation Development Program (UNDP), Human Development 
Report 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 127. 
14Santoso, “Political Chalanges to Sustainable Development in Indonesia,” 
121-137. 
15See Hal Hill, “Ownership in Indonesia: Who Owns What and Does It 
Matter?,” dalam Indonesia Assesment 1990, ed. oleh Hal Hill, Terry Hull, dan Terry 
Hull (Canbera: Departement of Political and Social Change, Research School of 
Asia Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian University, 1990). 
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inequality between Java and outside Java also became an economic 
development problem. Despite the fact that most of the economic 
activities are concentrated in Java, this region has had the highest 
proportion of the population living below the poverty line. In West 
Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java, the percentage of 
people living below the poverty line was 32.7%, 57.9%, 59.9%, 
54.9% respectively.16 
Although the People’s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia 
has officially legitimised participation as essential to national 
development, its meaning has been distorted in the context of state-
led development (top-down). Participation is not seen by the state as 
challenging its monopoly on decision making and is not in opposition 
to the state. Therefore, such participation discourages people from 
bargaining strongly for power vis a vis the state and, in turn, weakens 
Indonesian civil society. The development efforts are virtually out of 
the people’s control and accordingly they are vulnerable to the abuse 
of the state power.17 This indicates that participation is trivial because 
without it top-down development progresses anyway.18 
 
C. LP3ES and Community Development in the Pesantren 
LP3ES and other Indonesian NGOs emerged in the 1970s in 
the context of a critique of national development strategy. These were 
created in reaction to the government approach to development, 
which was considered inadequate, top-down and non-participative. 
LP3ES was established in 1971 by intellectual and student reformers 
of the 1966 generation with support from German Friedrich 
 
16Hal Hill dan Anna Weidemann, “Regional Development in Indonesia: 
Pattern and Issues,” dalam Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Development in 
Indonesia Since 1970, ed. oleh Hal Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
42. 
17Santoso, “Political Chalanges to Sustainable Development in Indonesia,” 
134. 
18Colin MacAndrew, “Central Government and Local Development in 
Indonesia: An Overview,” dalam Central Government and Local Development 
inIndonesia, ed. oleh Colin MacAndrew (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 9. 
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Naumann Stiftung (FNS).19 The main concern of LP3ES was to 
counter the negative impact of development by offering alternatives. 
It also positioned itself as the state partner and as the mediating 
institution between the state and people. In advancing the 
development model with a more popular and human face, LP3ES first 
uses indigenous skills and resources; secondly, it focuses on 
redistribution and targeting towards meeting the basic needs of the 
masses; and thirdly, it develops strategies of popular participation for 
achieving these goals.20 
The LP3ES socio-cultural background reflects part of a broad 
tradition of modernist Islam, with some patronage from technocrats 
associated with the former Socialist Party of Indonesia (PSI). Its 
network of members and associates has extensive links with major 
facets of Islamic life in Indonesia; hence, modernization and 
democratization of Islamic institutions have always formed part of its 
mission.21 It was during the 1970s that the Muslim young generation 
involved in the Islamic renewal movement emerged to seek 
alternatives beyond the political arena in order to allow Islam to fulfil 
an important social role. They combined Islamic teachings, western 
social theories and the socio-political reality of Indonesian society. 
Therefore, the main agendas of this movement were re-actualisation 
of Islam in a modern context through renewal of Islamic thoughts, 
politics and bureaucracy.22 
Realising the negative impact of national development, some 
Muslim activists of this renewal movement moved their focus to 
grass roots empowerment in rural areas.  They were compelled to 
address the more tangible or immediate problems confronted by 
Indonesian society at large, the majority of which is Muslim, such as 
the socio-economic and political impacts of the regime’s policy 
which puts too heavy an emphasis on stability and growth at the 
 
19LP3ES, Program Latihan Pengembangan Masyarakat Desa Melalui 
Lembaga Tradisionil Pedesaan: Pesantren [unpublished paper] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 
2001), xi-xii. 
20Philip J. Eldridge, Non-Goverment Organizations and Democratic 
Participation in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), 87. 
21Philip J. Eldridge, “Non-Governmental Organisation and the Role of 
State in Indonesia,” 1988, 86-87. 
22See Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic 
Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001). 
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expense of popular participation and distribution.23 These activists 
viewed the New Order’s development policies in light of the social 
transformative dimension of Islamic teachings and dependency 
theory. Their agenda was basically political--that is, the formation of 
a strong civil society vis-à-vis the state. Many activists, such as 
Dawam Rahardjo who joined LP3ES in the early 1970s, channeled 
such ideals through NGO (LSM) movements.  
In the 1970s LP3ES used its links with the pesantren as an 
entry point for promoting more participatory approaches to social and 
economic development. Many urban activists had become aware of 
their lack of links with rural people, and saw this lack as weakening 
the support for, and legitimacy of, their struggles to effect change at 
higher levels of politics and decision making. Their pesantren 
program was basically intended to build capability and consciousness 
in the Muslim society at a grass roots level, leading towards the 
formation of an autonomous middle class as an important element in 
the development of a democratic political system. In other words, the 
long term goal of this program was to establish a cultural movement 
for democratization and social and political transformation at the 
national level. 24 Since the pesantren are largely identified as the 
educational institutions of traditionalist Islam, LP3ES was aware of 
the significance of cultivating co-operation with individuals 
associated with NU (Nahdhatul Ulama) as the organisation par 
excellence of Indonesia’s Islamic traditionalism.  
The cooperation between LP3ES and the pesantren resulted 
in the establishment of a new NGO in 1983, P3M (Perhimpunan 
Pengembangan Pesantren and Masyarakat, the Indonesian Society 
for Pesantren and Community Development). The establishment of 
P3M was basically intended to channel the German FNS funds for at 
least the next ten years to continue the LP3ES pesantren program. 
The FNS did not fund particular projects for more than ten years.25 
 
23Effendy, 86-87. 
24Eldridge, Non-Goverment Organizations and Democratic Participation 
in Indonesia, 92, 177; See also Mansour Faqih, “Pengembangan Masyarakat di 
Pesantren: Hambatan dan Permasalahan,” dalam The Impact of Pesantren in 
Education and Community Development in Indonesia, ed. oleh Manfred Oepen dan 
Wolfgang Karcher (Jakarta: P3M, 1985), 153. 
25Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa dan Pencairan 
Makna Baru (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994), 246-247. 
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Both LP3ES and P3M continued to cooperate through training 
programs, forums and the distribution of each other’s literature; 
therefore, P3M operationally inherited the ideology and methodology 
of community development applied by LP3ES in the pesantren.26 To 
expand the involvement of the pesantren in community development, 
P3M established the pesantren network. In addition, through this 
network the pesantren could take over NGO roles in rural areas.27 
The inclusion of the pesantren into the LP3ES program 
signaled the starting point for pesantren involvement in 
institutionalised community development. This was signified by the 
installation of a new organisation in the pesantren known as BPPM 
(Biro Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, Bureau for 
Pesantren and Community Development).  This innovation did not 
mean that the pesantren had never been involved in providing social 
services for villagers. Rather, the establishment of BPPM only 
changed the nature of the pesantren activity from sporadic to 
continuing and organized. BPPM was intended to serve as a local 
NGO which had the ability to organize and mobilize society to solve 
their local problems. Itwas also intended to ensure the continuation of 
development programs in the pesantren.28 
 
D. Paradigm of Community Development in Pesantren 
In achieving the long term purpose of community 
development in the pesantren LP3ES did not always oppose policies 
initiated by the state. Instead, LP3ES preferred to work closely with 
the state, that is, relevant bureaucratic agencies, to implement 
programs,29seeking to cooperate and create dialogue with institutions 
in order to try and influence their policy (inside-in strategy). They 
argued that that the only way to transform government is to work 
 
26See also Eldridge, “Non-Governmental Organisation and the Role of 
State in Indonesia,” 180; Faqih, “Pengembangan Masyarakat di Pesantren: 
Hambatan dan Permasalahan,” 137. 
27Faqih, “Pengembangan Masyarakat di Pesantren: Hambatan dan 
Permasalahan,” 152. 
28Erfan Maryono, “Aktualisasi Peran Kemasyarakatan Pesantren: refleksi 
Pengalaman LPSM,” Pesantren, 1988, 34-41. 
29Effendy, Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political 
Ideas and Practices in Indonesia, 88-89. 
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with the government and slowly produce change through education 
and negotiation.30 
While working with grass roots people to provide direct 
services and basic resources, some CD NGOs also presented a 
fundamental challenge to political, economic, and patriarchal 
structure. This strategy is very different from the ‘outside-in’ strategy, 
which proposed change by putting pressure on institutions and people 
without actually engaging the particular target in dialogue. This 
strategy is employed by advocacy NGOs that foster a more radical 
approach to empowerment, and seek structural change that impacts 
upon power relations to produce collective empowerment at regional, 
national, and international levels. They avoid direct engagement with 
the government, preferring to challenge and confront the state.  They 
have been involved in the pro-democracy movement, and anti-
corruption and anti-debt campaigns, such as LBH, WALHI and 
INFID.31 
 Whitelum argues that the increased political repression of the 
New Order regime, especially in the mid 1970s, influenced NGOs 
such as LP3ES to adopt their paradigm.32 The New Order only 
tolerated NGOs that endorsed charitable causes or the New Order 
Development agenda. With the decrease in oil revenues, the regime 
found that its development programs relied upon the efforts of NGOs 
to fund national development. Endorsing NGOs to achieve 
development objectives helped the New Order to maintain political 
stability, and attract foreign investment. This political climate allowed 
NGOs delivering various services such as health, education and small 
scale economic development to survive, increase in number and 
hamper the overtly political oriented NGOs.  
However, the ‘inside–in strategy’ was vulnerable to being co-
opted by the New Order government and caused structural problems. 
Such problems were faced also by donors when trying to engage the 
government in poverty alleviation work. The government’s political, 
economic and social structures were considered to be the core of the 
 
30Bernadette Whitelum, “Rhetoric and Reality in The World Bank’s 
Relations With NGOs: An Indonesian Case Study” (PhD Thesis, The Australian 
National University, 2003), 174-177. 
31Whitelum, 174. 
32Whitelum, 155. 
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problems disempowering the people. Involving the state in this work 
might serve to sustain the process of disempowerment.33 Hulme and 
Edwards warn that NGO programs will be co-opted by the process of 
engagement, that they will cease being advocates for the people and 
instead become development contractors or implementers of donor or 
government programs.34  The fear is that they will become tools of a 
development paradigm (top-down) they do not support.35 
This is apparent in the case of LP3ES. Despite the fact that 
LP3ES promoted community development in the pesantren as an 
alternative to the top-down development model and as a means for 
social transformation, it was largely parallel to the government 
development paradigm (Modernization). Like other CD NGOs 
involved in development activities in the late 1970s, LP3ES did not 
introduce a radical alternative paradigm of development, but merely 
tried to ‘reform’ and reacted to the methodology and practices of the 
government development model, without questioning its basic 
assumption. They tended to neglect the problems of class 
exploitation, political oppression, gender bias, and the state’s cultural 
and ideological hegemony of development.36 They regarded the 
theory of development supported by the government with the growth 
model translated in Repelita (five-year development plan) as good.  
What they found problematic was the approach and methodology: a 
top-down and non-participative approach to development. Therefore, 
the NGO’s task was to guide the people in generating knowledge, 
skills and attitudes with a view to becoming ‘modern’, and capable of 
‘participation’ in development.  
 To begin with, LP3ES interest in the pesantren was based on 
the assumption that the pesantren was an effective instrument to 
disseminate development ideas and programs, and to mobilise local 
 
33Susan Higinbothan Holcombe, Managing empower: The Grameen 
Bank’s Experience of Poverty Alleviation (London: Zed Book, 1995), 18. 
34David Hulme dan Michael Edwards, “Scaling-Up the Developmental 
Impact of NGOs: Concepts and Experiences,” dalam Making a Difference: NGOs 
and Development in a Changing World, ed. oleh Michael Edwards dan David 
Hulme (London: Earthscan, 1994), 13-27. 
35Whitelum, “Rhetoric and Reality in The World Bank’s Relations With 
NGOs: An Indonesian Case Study,” 193-194. 
36Faqih, “The Role of Non-Govermental Organizations in Social 
Transformation: A Participaory Inquiry in Indonesia,” 113–18, 173. 
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resources and rural society for national development purposes.37 
Based on the seminar on Social Participation held by LP3ES and 
TEMPO weekly in Bogor in September 1971, LP3ES conducted a 
feasibility study to explore the possibility of utilising pesantren to 
stimulate social participation in national development (Maryono, 
1988: 30-31). In this study the pesantren’s position in the village was 
examined and linked to village development, vocational training, and 
the creation of employment opportunities in agriculture, handicrafts 
and production units. The study concluded that the pesantren had the 
potential to induce social participation in rural society, and increase 
the success of national development.38As an institution growing from 
and within society, the pesantren had significant influence on rural 
society. This was palpable in its role in offering services such as 
traditional education to the villagers when modern education could 
not be accessed in rural areas. The pesantren also became the symbol 
of social and political countervailing to the oppressor, at times such as 
the Dutch colonial period.  This was achieved by practising politics of 
isolation when villages were still free from the touch of political 
forces.39 In short, the pesantren was the main social, cultural, and 
religious dynamic of traditional Muslim society.  
The paradigm of community development in the pesantren 
was intended to transform the pesantren from a traditional to a 
modern institution, and was based on Modernization theory.  It 
assumed that the backward mentality, behaviour and culture of 
people, such as the low level of their ‘need for achievement’ and 
other traditional values, prevented them from developing and 
growing. This backward mentality and values were considered to be 
the main cause of their lack of participation in development. 
Involving the pesantren in the LP3ES program constituted the 
‘salvation movement’ from the negative impact of the New Order 
Modernization, which proceeded quickly and demanded radical 
changes in both way of life and institutions, from traditional to 
 
37MM. Billah, “Dari Paradigma Instrumentalist ke Paradigma Alternatif,” 
Pesantren, 1988, 12-13. 
38See Soedjoko Prasodjo, ed., Profil Pesantren: Laporan Hasil Penelitian 
Pesantren Al-Fallah dan Delaoan Lainnya di Bogor (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982). 
39Billah, “Dari Paradigma Instrumentalist ke Paradigma Alternatif,” 290. 
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modern.40 At that time, the pesantren was regarded as a traditional 
and rural institution which symbolised backwardness, resistance to 
the outside world, and a traditional lifestyle. The pesantren only 
focused on religious education (tafaqquh fi al-din) and produced 
graduates who did not have a great social impact within society: they 
could not respond appropriately to complex social problems beyond 
the religious sphere.41 These internal shortages resulted in failure of 
the pesantren to support national development. The LP3ES program 
encouraged the pesantren to adjust itself to modernization and the 
villagers’ demands, and helped the pesantren become a catalyst for 
rural development. The pesantren’s role would become greater, and 
its contribution to socio-cultural transformation would be more 
meaningful, once the pesantren could respond appropriately to 
society’s problems.  This could be achieved by alleviating poverty, 
eradicating social and economic gaps, and disseminating new relevant 
knowledge and technology. With these changes, the pesantren 
functioned not only as a traditional educational institution but also as 
(i) the centre for village training in development of knowledge, 
logical thinking, skills, and personal guidance for rural society, and 
(ii) a village-based, rural institution enhancing self-help belief with 
the aim of developing its environment economically, physically and 
spiritually.42 
LP3ES programs in the pesantren almost replicated those that 
targeted small entrepreneurs, alsodeveloped by LP3ES. These 
development programs had focused on three major components: 
development of entrepreneurial skills and attitudes (AMT), transfer of 
appropriate technology and income generating activities. The latter 
activity replicated the Department of Religious Affairs’ pesantren 
program in the early 1970s.43These projects were intended to 
motivate people to participate in small-scale economic development 
 
40M. Dawam Rahardjo, Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari 
Bawah (Jakarta: P3M, 1985), xiii. 
41MM. Billah, “Pemikiran Awal Pengembangan Pesantren,” dalam 
Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari bawah, ed. oleh M. Dawam 
Rahardjo (Jakarta: P3M, 1985), 294. 
42Manfred Ziemek, Pesantren Dalam Perubahan Sosial (Jakarta: P3M, 
1986), 213-215. 
43Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa dan Pencairan Makna 
Baru, 245. 
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as a means of increasing the welfare of the target group. LP3ES 
believed that the development process would work if capital was 
given to the right people: those highly motivated to achieve 
outcomes, with skills in the micro technology of business, such as 
marketing, accounting and financial management. These 
entrepreneurs would become the drivers of the growth process, and 
the rest of the community would benefit from the trickle down 
effect.44 
During the cooperation between LP3ES/P3M and the 
pesantren, the latter only focused on the implementation of the 
development programs and neglected the underlying objective of such 
programs. In fact, none of the development programs in the 
pesantren, such as cooperatives, savings and loans, appropriate 
technologies, small scale industries and income generating activities, 
were the main objectives of community development. Rather, they 
were entry points to achieve the long term objective, namely, a 
cultural movement for democratisation and social transformation of 
the pesantren and rural society.45 The NGO activists were reluctant to 
express to the kyai their true aims of the democratisation of the 
pesantren and of the village. LP3ES and P3M did not want the kyai to 
reject their programs, and they wanted to maintain good relationships 
with the kyai to ensure the sustainability of their projects in the 
pesantren. That is why technical and methodological issues were 
always raised in needs assessment discussions.   Such issues included 
the need of the pesantren to participate in national development, but 
excluded discussion of the need for democratisation in the village.46In 
this context, Johnston47 regards such NGOs as LP3ES as ‘pengrajin 
social’(social craftsmen) implying that their work demanded great 
effort and a high level of concentration to achieve even minimal 
changes in a very confined area. Their preference to work in a limited 
 
44Faqih, “Pengembangan Masyarakat di Pesantren: Hambatan dan 
Permasalahan,” 117. 
45Faqih, “The Role of Non-Govermental Organizations in Social 
Transformation: A Participaory Inquiry in Indonesia,” 153. 
46Faqih, 153. 
47Marry Johnston, “Non-Goverment Organizations at The Crossroads in 
Indonesia,” dalam Indonesian Ecconomic Development: Approaches, Tchnology, 
Small-Scale Textiles, Urban Infrastrukture and NGOs, ed. oleh RC. Rice (Clayton, 
Victoria: Centre of Sotheast Asian Studies: Monash University, 1990), 82. 
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number of small communities to improve their standard of life and 
dignity resulted in difficulties in promoting change at the national 
level. 
 
E. Conclusion 
 Community development in the pesantren was initiated by 
Muslim activists who joined LP3ES and P3M. Having been inspired 
bythesocial transformative dimension of Islamic teachings and 
dependency theory, these activists sought to empower grass root 
society who was facing the socio-economic and political negative 
impacts of the New Order development policy.   This policy stressed 
stability and growth at the expense of people participation and even 
distribution. LP3ES and P3M efforts to use the pesantren as the entry 
point for promoting participatory approaches to social and economic 
development were intended not only to create people participation, 
but also to build capability and consciousness of Muslim society at 
grass roots level.  This led to the formation of an autonomous middle 
class--an important instrument of democratization and social and 
political transformation. In other words, their agenda was basically 
political, that is, the formation of a strong civil society vis-à-vis the 
state.  
LP3ES and P3M provided pesantren facilitators with 
knowledge of participatory methods, and training such as needs 
assessment, consciousness raising amongst the people, and 
Participatory Action Research (PAR).  These were important parts of 
a broader strategy to stimulate people participation at the local level. 
However, there was inconsistency between the LP3ES paradigm and 
the long term objective of community development. While LP3ES 
intended to create social and political transformation through the 
pesantren, its ‘inside-in strategy’ and paradigm were strongly 
influenced by the Modernization assumption advocated by the New 
Order. Its intention to transform the pesantren life from traditional to 
‘modern’ and to utilise the pesantren as an instrument to support the 
national development was reflected in its programs. Moreover, 
pesantren development programs were mainly concerned with service 
delivery (such as saving and loans, cooperatives and income 
generating) rather than advocacy activities. In addition, Participatory 
Action Research and ‘radical’ Freirean conscientisation were mixed 
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with modern Islamic theology and McClelland’s N-Ach training to 
become transforming tools for modernity. The focus of LP3ES on 
service delivery, and its preference for working in a limited number 
of small communities to improve their living standard resulted in 
LP3ES becoming ‘pengrajin social’(social craftsmen), which limited 
its capacity to promote social and political transformation beyond the 
local context. [.] 
 
 
References 
 
Ali, Fachri, dan Bahtiar Effendy. Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: 
Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru. 
Bandung: Mizan, 1986. 
Billah, MM. “Dari Paradigma Instrumentalist ke Paradigma 
Alternatif.” Pesantren, 1988. 
———. “Pemikiran Awal Pengembangan Pesantren.” Dalam 
Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari bawah, 
disunting oleh M. Dawam Rahardjo. Jakarta: P3M, 1985. 
Booth, Anne. Agricultural Development in Indonesia. Sydney: Allen 
and Unwin, 1988. 
Bruinessen, Martin van. NU: Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa dan 
Pencairan Makna Baru. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994. 
Budiman, Arief. “The emergence of the Bureaucratic Capitalist State 
in Indonesia.” Dalam Reflections on Development in 
Southeast Asia. Sinagpore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1988. 
Effendy, Bahtiar. Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic 
Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS, 
2001. 
Eldridge, Philip J. Non-Goverment Organizations and Democratic 
Participation in Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1995. 
———. “Non-Governmental Organisation and the Role of State in 
Indonesia,” 1988. 
Modernization and Pesantren Based Community Development in Indonesia 
JAWI, Volume2, No.1(2019) 17 
 
Faqih, Mansour. “Pengembangan Masyarakat di Pesantren: Hambatan 
dan Permasalahan.” Dalam The Impact of Pesantren in 
Education and Community Development in Indonesia, 
disunting oleh Manfred Oepen dan Wolfgang Karcher. 
Jakarta: P3M, 1985. 
———. “The Role of Non-Govermental Organizations in Social 
Transformation: A Participaory Inquiry in Indonesia.” UMI 
Dissertation Service, 1995. 
Hettne, Bjorn. Development Theory and The Three Worlds: Towards 
an International Political Economy of Development. New 
York: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1995. 
Hill, Hal. “Ownership in Indonesia: Who Owns What and Does It 
Matter?” Dalam Indonesia Assesment 1990, disunting oleh 
Hal Hill, Terry Hull, dan Terry Hull. Canbera: Departement 
of Political and Social Change, Research School of Asia 
Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian University, 1990. 
Hill, Hal, dan Anna Weidemann. “Regional Development in 
Indonesia: Pattern and Issues.” Dalam Unity and Diversity: 
Regional Economic Development in Indonesia Since 1970, 
disunting oleh Hal Hill. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989. 
Holcombe, Susan Higinbothan. Managing empower: The Grameen 
Bank’s Experience of Poverty Alleviation. London: Zed Book, 
1995. 
Hulme, David, dan Michael Edwards. “Scaling-Up the 
Developmental Impact of NGOs: Concepts and Experiences.” 
Dalam Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a 
Changing World, disunting oleh Michael Edwards dan David 
Hulme. London: Earthscan, 1994. 
Johnston, Marry. “Non-Goverment Organizations at The Crossroads 
in Indonesia.” Dalam Indonesian Ecconomic Development: 
Approaches, Tchnology, Small-Scale Textiles, Urban 
Infrastrukture and NGOs, disunting oleh RC. Rice. Clayton, 
Victoria: Centre of Sotheast Asian Studies: Monash 
University, 1990. 
Bambang Budiwiranto 
18 DOI://dx.doi.org/10.24042/jw.v1i1.5885 
  
LP3ES. Program Latihan Pengembangan Masyarakat Desa Melalui 
Lembaga Tradisionil Pedesaan: Pesantren [unpublished 
paper]. Jakarta: LP3ES, 2001. 
MacAndrew, Colin. “Central Government and Local Development in 
Indonesia: An Overview.” Dalam Central Government and 
Local Development inIndonesia, disunting oleh Colin 
MacAndrew. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Maryono, Erfan. “Aktualisasi Peran Kemasyarakatan Pesantren: 
refleksi Pengalaman LPSM.” Pesantren, 1988. 
Prasodjo, Soedjoko, ed. Profil Pesantren: Laporan Hasil Penelitian 
Pesantren Al-Fallah dan Delaoan Lainnya di Bogor. Jakarta: 
LP3ES, 1982. 
Rahardjo, M. Dawam. Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun 
dari Bawah. Jakarta: P3M, 1985. 
Ramage, Douglas. Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and The 
Ideology of Tolerance. London: Routledge, 1995. 
Rostow, WW. The Stage of Economic: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. 
Santoso, Purwo. “Political Chalanges to Sustainable Development in 
Indonesia.” MA Thesis, UMI Dissertation Service, 1992. 
United Nation Development Program (UNDP). Human Development 
Report 1991. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Vatikiotis, Michael J. Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, 
Development, and Pressure for Change. London: Routledge, 
1994. 
Whitelum, Bernadette. “Rhetoric and Reality in The World Bank’s 
Relations With NGOs: An Indonesian Case Study.” PhD 
Thesis, The Australian National University, 2003. 
World Bank. World Development Report 1991: Proverty. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Ziemek, Manfred. Pesantren Dalam Perubahan Sosial. Jakarta: P3M, 
1986. 
 
